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Dear Reasoners,
I am delighted to present to
you, in this new year issue of
The Reasoner, an interview with
Paul Égré. Paul Égré is a Senior
Researcher at the Institut Jean
Nicod (CNRS) and a Professor
in the Philosophy Department
of École Normale Supérieure in
Paris. Much of his work deals
with the semantics, epistemology,
and psychology of vagueness in language and in perception.
Some of his more recent contributions concern the varieties
of logical consequence and the nature of concepts. I had the
chance to meet him during my studies in Paris, and, more
recently, to have him as a member of my PhD thesis committee
in Turin. The path of an analytic philosopher in continental
France, the value of vagueness in communication, and what
science can bring to philosophy are only some of the topics we
discuss in this interview. I hope you will find our conversation




Interview with Paul Égré
Lina Lissia: First of all, I’m curious about your study path. I
know that you went to the École normale Supérieure, a very
selective French institution to which only the very best students
in France are admitted. What happened before that? When did
you decide you would become a philosopher? Was it before
your arrival at the ENS or when you were studying there?
Paul Égré: The first time I heard about philosophy was from
my elder sister. I was 8. In France philosophy is part of the
curriculum in high school; in your final year you get an intro-
duction. My sister was very enthusiastic about her philosophy
teacher and classes. Around the dinner table she would talk
to us about consciousness and other topics. I remember being
impressed by the idea that we have consciousness, which as a
child I mainly interpreted in a moral sense, but the issue was
also whether there are things that we are not conscious of. I
think I got pretty quickly the idea that philosophy is about dis-
cussing problems to which you don’t have the answer.
In the early 90s my parents moved to Toulouse. There I was
very lucky to meet Serge Dejean (1950-2020), a philosopher
and teacher who was a wonderful person and mentor. We met
at the public library, where I remember doing research on the
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sophists, and where Serge was working on the history of de-
portation around Toulouse. It was a blessing to have a friend
like him, he opened a world of books and philosophy to me.
Funny enough, Serge was not at
all into analytic philosophy. Back
then, almost nobody in France
knew about analytic philosophy,
apart from a handful of people,
whom I happened to meet later.
Serge respected all classic and
modern philosophers, but was par-
ticularly enthusiastic about more
recent figures, who, you know, are
not well looked upon by the ana-
lytic tradition. Thanks to him I dis-
covered Heidegger, Barthes, Berg-
son, Levinas. I admired Bergson’s
scientific culture: specifically, the combined interests in meta-
physics and psychophysics in his early work. I tried to read as
much as I could.
After high school, I went to classe préparatoire and was
admitted at École normale supérieure the next year. Even
before my time at ENS I was aware that what I wanted to learn
was a combination of mathematical methods and philosophy.
In Paris, I quickly learned that there was a logic programme at
Sorbonne. I had three great logic professors there in my first
year: François Rivenc, Jean Mosconi, and Jacques Dubucs.
Jacques Dubucs became my PhD supervisor later. Thanks to
Rivenc, in particular, I discovered Frege, Russell, Husserl,
and Carnap. I also took classes in undergraduate mathematics
at Paris Diderot University. Then I passed the Agrégation in
philosophy (another examination you take in France if you
want to become a philosophy teacher). After that, thanks to
advice given by Francis Wolff and François Rivenc, I spent
a fantastic and decisive year at Princeton in the philosophy
department as a visiting grad student. John Burgess was
my advisor, and I took seminars with David Lewis, Bas van
Fraassen, Delia Fara, Gideon Rosen... I also attended courses
by John Conway and Yakov Sinai in the Maths Department.
Upon my return I decided I should learn more logic and did
the Master’s in logic at Paris 7 University.
LL: How did you get interested in analytic philosophy in the
first place? You told me that at some point you realized that you
wanted to learn mathematical methods. How come? Your early
philosophical education seems to be the typical, continental,
French education. So what brought you to analytic philosophy?
PÉ: By the time I was leaving Toulouse to go to Paris I
was very interested in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the
French anthropologist. Lévi-Strauss was also a philosopher,
and in his writings he made very clear that he was interested in
a combination of philosophy and empirical methods. He also
made very clear that he had a lot of respect for mathematics
(witness his collaboration with André Weil): for him, you
couldn’t do serious anthropology if you ignored mathematics.
My role models back then where people who could bring
together philosophy, with its very speculative questions, and
science, with its exact methods. I felt that there was too
much room for doubt in philosophy. I liked the firm grounds
mathematics seemed to provide.
LL: There is something really striking about your CV, which
is the centrality of vagueness as a research topic. What brought
you to this topic in the first place? Did you get interested in
vagueness during your PhD?
PÉ: In part, yes. My PhD was about epistemic paradoxes
and propositional attitudes; so it was really about looking
at knowledge and belief from various perspectives, from the
perspective of attributions as well as from the perspective of
modeling their content. In 2000, the year I started my PhD,
Timothy Williamson published Knowledge and its Limits. That
book had a huge impact, including in Paris, where Williamson
was invited by Pascal Engel. I was particularly intrigued
by the chapter on Anti-luminosity, where Williamson argues
against positive introspection, the idea that knowing implies
knowing that one knows. The way he argues against this
principle is by building an epistemic Sorites. This led me
into thinking about soritical arguments more broadly. The
discussion of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument became a
chapter of my PhD and kept me busy for several years after that.
LL: My previous question was “what brought you to
vagueness?”. My next question will be: what kept you there?
What is it that you find so fascinating and important about
vagueness? When someone skims through your CV one has
the impression that no matter the topic, it’s always a bit about
vagueness; not all the time of course, but still...
PÉ: That’s very true, actually! Beside my interest for
paradoxes, what kept me there were further foundational
questions. In particular, it was the gradual realization that
vagueness is such a pervasive phenomenon in language and
thought. Each speaker attaches a slightly different meaning to
a large number of expressions in natural language, and still we
manage to communicate. The fact that there is this capacity
for mutual understanding, but on a backdrop of massive
inter-individual variability in meaning is what fascinates me
the most about vagueness. As you know, Frege has a very
objectivist view of meaning; his conception of meaning, which
is based on the compositionality principle, seems to rule out
vagueness. What I find really interesting and not completely
solved yet is the problem of combining Frege’s programme
for compositionality of language with the observation that
linguistic meanings can vary significantly between speakers.
This is one important aspect of what “kept me there”.
LL: It’s funny because I have the impression that your
interest for vagueness reflects your early interest for analytic
philosophy, as you’re still trying to keep together objectivity
and subjectivity: as a student you thought that there was
too much place for subjectivity and doubt in philosophy,
whence the need for mathematical methods. My next question
originates from something which is also quite striking about
your work, that is, the constant dialogue with two disciplines:
psychology and linguistics. On this, I have a broader question
and a more narrow one. The (relatively) narrow question is
about your method in philosophy: what can psychology and
linguistics bring to philosophy? And the broader question
(which is perhaps too broad!) is: what is your conception of
philosophy? You never get to ask philosophers this question at
conferences, so I’ll jump at the chance...
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PÉ: During and after my PhD I learned a lot of linguistics.
That was driven in large part by the fact that back then I was
working on knowledge and belief as propositional attitudes,
and in a way the history of formal semantics originates in the
long-standing problem of giving truth conditions for proposi-
tional attitudes. That’s how I came to work on questions and
their interaction with attitude verbs. Then what gradually led
me into psychology was my work on vagueness: it was clear to
me that you couldn’t understand much about vagueness with-
out looking into how people effectively categorize and discrim-
inate. Of course, there are various ways of doing that: you can
turn to mathematical psychology, which can be very philosoph-
ical. You can also collect behavioral data and take a more nat-
uralized approach to philosophical questions. When I started
my first project on vagueness (in 2007-2008), these were also
the years experimental philosophy was becoming big. Many
people back then viewed experimental philosophy as a way
of sweeping away the traditional methods in philosophy, es-
pecially armchair methods. But this has never been my view.
To me if there is anything interesting in psychology (and in
empirical sciences more generally), it is rather to get more an-
swers out of theoretical models, or to extract more theory out
of empirical data.
This leads to me to your second question, about my con-
ception of philosophy. My conception is very simple: it really
has to do with concepts and meaning. I see philosophy as the
business by which we try to clarify our concepts, by which
we try to get as clear conceptions as we can. Because of that,
I consider that the role of science is to eliminate vagueness
and confusion as much as possible. I believe in the ideal
of precision, and this is also why I completely share the
Carnapian and neo-Carnapian projects: explicating concepts.
The purpose of philosophy is to give the clearest possible
formulation of problems which are really difficult to articulate.
LL: What are you working on now and what are your
projects for the near future?
PÉ: Unsurprisingly, one of my latest projects still concerns
vagueness. The project aims to give an account of the function
of vagueness in ordinary language. My goal is to understand
the sources of vagueness: why is natural language vague? I
think that there are different sources of vagueness. I believe that
in part the epistemic theory is right: vagueness partly originates
from imperfect discrimination. But I think that the source of
vagueness is in part semantic too. In fact, I believe that the
opposition between the epistemic view and the semantic view
is inadequate: we should move beyond that and recognize that
vagueness is a multi-source phenomenon.
Concerning communication, the view that I’ve been explor-
ing is that linguistic vagueness is not a deficiency; it is a feature
we pragmatically recruit to optimize accuracy in communica-
tive exchanges. This may seem counterintuitive, especially in
light of my comment about the ideal of precision in science, but
here’s the idea: a cooperative speaker who is not perfectly in-
formed about the world (maybe because of imperfect discrimi-
nation), would make too much error if pressed to communicate
with only precise expressions. More than that, she would mis-
represent her uncertainty. In joint work with Benjamin Spector,
Adèle Mortier and Steven Verheyen, we show that there ex-
ist situations in which using precise expressions is suboptimal
compared to using vague expressions. This is a view that was
partly sketched by some theorists of vagueness, but the precise
shape we’re giving it is novel.
Another project I’m working on at the moment concerns the
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of perception: Jackson
Graves, Vincent de Gardelle, Daniel Pressnitzer and I are in-
vestigating the phenomenon of perceptual ambiguity. We’re
wondering under which conditions we become aware of the
ambiguity of a stimulus. This is still connected to vagueness,
because ambiguity and vagueness are related phenomena.
Finally, I am keeping an active interest in logic, in particular
in the many-valued and substructural approaches originating
from my collaboration with Pablo Cobreros, David Ripley,
and Robert van Rooij on strict-tolerant logic. With Eduardo
Barrio, we are currently editing a special issue of the Journal of
Philosophical Logic on substructural logics, and with Lorenzo
Rossi I am coordinating a handbook project on trivalent logics.
LL: This all sounds very interesting, thanks. My last
question will be about the situation of analytic philosophy in
France. France has the reputation of not being an easy place for
analytic philosophers. Are things changing? In recent years,
two analytic philosophers, Claudine Tiercelin and François
Récanati, have been appointed professors at the Collège de
France, arguably the most important academic institution in
France. Is this a good sign?
PÉ: I’m very optimistic about the situation of analytic
philosophy in France. When I look back at the mid-90’s, the
status of analytic philosophy in France was very confidential.
What I see now, more than twenty years later, is that analytic
philosophy is more widely accessible to the students, and there
is more demand for it too, with more international hirings (viz.
Andrew Arana in Sorbonne/Nancy, Igor Douven at CNRS, or
recently Denis Buehler at ENS). People who have graduated
from IJN, IHPST, and other analytic-oriented programmes in
France generally find positions, either at the university or in
high school. Some are active on the social media, even on
Youtube, such as Thibaut Giraud. Beside Claudine Tiercelin
and François Récanati, very recently Luigi Rizzi was elected
at the Collège de France on the chair of general linguistics. A
friend and a disciple of Chomsky, he is very supportive of the
circulations between philosophy and linguistics. More broadly
I think the perception of analytic philosophy has changed, I see
more interest from the students, and various subfields are very
active in France at the moment, not just cognitive philosophy,
but philosophy of biology, political philosophy, etc. What
I also observe is a lot more mutual respect and interaction
between various philosophical traditions. This is very palpable
in the Department of Philosophy of ENS where I teach.
LL: Well, these seem to be very good signs indeed. Thanks
a lot for your time!
Necessity in a Possible World
Can a proposition be necessarily true in one possible world and
not in another? It would appear not, if we accept S5. For
S 5a : PosNecp→ NecNecp
is a theorem of S5. And S5a expressed as:
S 5b : (Ew)Necpw→ (w)Necpw
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where w ranges over the domain of possible worlds, rules it out.
For it states, that:
S 5c: If there is a possible world where p is necessary
then in every possible world p is necessary.
Hence a possible world cannot be defined by the propositions
which are true in that world. For if p were part of the definition
of a world w, then p could not be false in w. But p will be
contingent even if it is necessarily true that p is true in w. For
there will be another world in which p is false.
Hence the propositions which are true in a world cannot pro-
vide a possible world its identity. In that case possible worlds
have no identity. But then, following Quine’s dictum of “no
entity without identity” (1969: “Speaking of Objects” in his
Ontological Relativity and other Essays. Columbia University
Press, p 23.), we must say that there are no possible worlds.
Hence we must then give up either S5, possible worlds or ig-
nore Quine’s dictum.
I wish to acknowledge my deep debt to Laureano Luna and to






we all learned to follow mathematical rules. We follow them,
and good things tend to happen. We can calculate mortgage
payments given a fixed interest rate, solutions of polynomials,
the intersection of lines, and so on and so forth.
There is a certain element of shock, when we learn that some
of these rules fail to apply in all cases. For example, not all mul-
tiplications are commutative (turning a body in the x − y-plane
by 90 degrees and then reflecting it along the y-axis is differ-
ent from first reflecting along the y-axis and then rotating it),
negative numbers have a root (
√
−1 = ±i), parallel lines can
intersect in the finite (parallel lines in curved space may inter-
sect) and the function f (x) which puts f (x) = 1 for rational
numbers and f (x) = 0 for non-rational real numbers can be in-
tegrated over every finite interval I (using the Lebesgue integral
one finds
∫
I f (x)dµ(x) = 0).
Some mathematical theories are first developed without any
clear interpretation nor with an application in mind. Significant
progress in mathematics has been made based on purely formal
analysis without interpretation and without application. Inter-
pretations and applications for some fields were later fund for
some such theories. Today, non-commutative algebra, complex
numbers, non-Euclidean geometry (e.g., differential and pro-
jective geometry) and Lebesgue integration do have very well-
established interpretations and applications.
I now want to suggest that we can consider giving up a cher-
ished and mathematical rule deeply engrained into us. I do not
know how to properly interpret nor do I know where to apply
my suggestion. I also do not know, whether this has been sug-
gested before. My point is, my suggestion may be interpreted
and applied at some later point in time. It may not.
We all learned in school that ‘minus times minus equals
plus’, (−1) · (−1) = 1. What if not? What if ‘minus times
minus equals minus’, (−a) · (−b) = −a · b for all positive real
numbers a, b?
So, such a “product” of n factors is “positive”, if and only
if all factors are “positive”. If there is one or more “negative”
number, then the entire “product” becomes “negative”. This
might mean something like: “a single bad apple (mould) makes
the entire bag of apples go to waste”.
If we accept that (−a) · (−b) = −a · b and keep multipli-
cation unchanged otherwise, we can note some properties that
look peculiar to our eyes (trained to believing that ‘minus times
minus equals plus’):
1. For all a < 0 there exists a number m = −1 , 1 such that
m · a = a = a · m = a · 1 = 1 · a (in the lingo of group
theory, there is more than one neutral element for negative
a).
2. For all a < 0 there exists no number m such that a · m = 1
(in the lingo of group theory, there is no inverse for nega-
tive a).
3. For all a, b < 0 it holds that a < b, if and only if −a < −b
(multiplication by −1 does not necessarily invert inequal-
ities).
4. For all a ≤ 0 ≤ b it holds that a · b = a · (−b).
5. For all n ∈ N it holds that −(xn) = 1 does not have a
solution (linear functions from R to R such as f (x) = −x−
1 that are not parallel to the y-axis may not have a root).
6. For all n ∈ N it holds that −(xn) = −1 has exactly two
solutions, x∗ ∈ {1,−1} (linear functions from R to R such
as f (x) = −x + 1 may have exactly two roots).
7. For all x and all n ∈ N there exists a unique y ∈ R such that
x = yn, for negative x we have y = − n
√
|x| and for positive x
we have y = n
√
x (roots always exist, are in R and unique).
The properties look strange to our eyes. I have long and unsuc-
cessfully thought about finding a sensible interpretation and/or





Responsible Life Science Policy between Private
and Public Funding - Workshop Report
Life sciences receive funding from both the public and private
sectors. These sectors variably emphasize commercially vi-
able and socially responsible research. Given the COVID-19
pandemic and the fact that most medical research is privately-
funded, the question of how to responsibly fund life science
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becomes even more urgent. For instance, decisions about how
the vaccine will be distributed will likely favor richer countries
and perhaps even deepen existing global economic inequalities.
One argument to justify such inequality is that the countries
or corporations who pay for the science should be the ones to
reap the rewards. To what extent this is convincing depends on
ethical questions about the status of intellectual property rights
and a host of national and international laws, as well as more
general issues about fairness and justice. In November 2020,
researchers gathered to discuss responsible life science fund-
ing policies. The speakers came from different backgrounds
including social studies of science (Sergio Sismondo), science
funding sector (Matthew Wallace), medicine (Ivor Ralph Ed-
wards), pharmacology (Rade Injac), and philosophy of science
(Manuela Fernandez Pinto and Jacob Stegenga).
The workshop started with Sergio Sismondo’s (Queen’s Uni-
versity) talk, which provided an overview of canonical works in
science and technology studies that may be useful for think-
ing about socially responsible funding policy more broadly.
These include insights that research should go into technolo-
gies whose impacts are relatively easy to undo, research on
civic epistemologies that tie questions of funding policy to-
gether with a host of national decision-making considerations,
and contentions that we should not engage in research where
there are no problems. He goes on to claim that all, or maybe
most, pharmaceutical research is best understood as a form of
marketing. Publication planning, ghost-writing articles, spon-
soring conferences or keynotes, and regulatory approval are,
according to Sismondo, steps towards mass prescriptions rather
than the development of reliable medical knowledge, as con-
temporary drugs are often either clinically ineffective or are
only slightly more effective than previous drugs.
In her talk, Manuela Fernandez Pinto (Universidad de los
Andes) focused more specifically on the impact of commercial-
ization of biomedical research. The impacts are, more or less,
the same during the COVID-19 pandemic, as Pinto argues that
very little has changed. Since the end of the Cold War private
funding for R&D, especially in pharmaceuticals, has steadily
increased to the point where roughly 70% of research is per-
formed and funded by the private sector. Most of this fund-
ing comes from companies profiting within the global north.
Research in the global south is mostly funded through spe-
cial grants, charity donations, and other mechanisms to transfer
both funds and research agendas from the global north. While
some journals such as Elsevier are making publications in their
journals open access, research on COVID-19 vaccines and ther-
apeutics are still driven by commercial interests. It should come
as no surprise, then, that the top 10 candidates for COVID-19
vaccines all involve private firms.
Mattew Wallace (International Development Research Cen-
tre) reminded us that science is often improved when it draws
on diverse sources of evidence. In the context of a global pan-
demic, we look for global solutions, which work best when
international collaborators are able to participate in their own
ways. Wallace highlighted three barriers to autonomous demo-
cratic global collaboration in science. First, many actors in the
global south face systemic external pressures. Often, they are
not in a position to set their own research agendas, as fund-
ing agencies from the global north dictate what is to be re-
searched, and how. Also, they do not have the same access
to research infrastructures, publishing venues, or even always
to the output of their own work. Second, within the global
south, national science funding bodies also face homogeniz-
ing influences, for example, from the private sector and lobby
groups. Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the notion of
“research excellence” itself, which drives most science fund-
ing decisions, inherits neo-colonial legacies unfit for the global
south. To move forward, more research is needed on how fund-
ing agencies in the north and south make funding decisions,
and to identify more precisely the power dynamics between all
the relevant institutions and organizations that influence these
decisions.
Rade Injac (Sandoz International GmbH, and the University
of Ljubljana) began his talk by defending the pharmaceutical
industry, emphasizing that it has increased the quality of life
for millions of people. According to Injac, many people crit-
icize pharmaceutical companies without really knowing what
goes on within them. On many occasions, companies receive
their funding from private agencies and individuals, e.g., fund-
ing from LGBT communities financed important HIV/AIDS
treatments. Also, some of the big corporations often work with
smaller start-ups, as with Pfizer and BioNTech, which allows
for the sharing of knowledge, methods, and resources. Ivor
Ralph Edwards (Uppsala Monitoring Center) approached the
topic of responsible life science from a medical perspective and
emphasized the importance of good evidence in clinical trials.
After revealing the worrisome fact that adverse drug reactions
are the fifth-highest cause of death in the US, Edwards advo-
cated for transparency in medical evidence and interaction with
the patients during the trials. In this way the monitoring agen-
cies can better evaluate the outcomes of the trials. Moreover,
responsible science funding, according to Edwards, should in-
clude not only short term project goals, but also their long term
impacts.
In the concluding talk, Jacob Stegenga (University of Cam-
bridge) discussed optimal ways of funding pandemic science.
As the pandemic spreads fast, rapid response from scientists
is required. In return, the rapid increase of scientific articles
makes it harder to track the research quality. In order to tame
quick science, Stengega pointed out, we need controls such as
randomized trials. He advocated for a proactive approach that
would be organized on an international level, as diseases do
not “respect” borders. Moreover, in the ideal case, this global
scientific response should be independent of industry biases.
The event has been co-hosted by the Carl Fredrich von
Weizsäcker Center of the University of Tübingen, Centre for
Philosophy of Science of the University of Geneva, and the Fo-
rum for Advancing Science and Education through Philosophy







University of Tübingen & University of Geneva
Calls for Papers
Pursuitworthiness in Scientific Inquiry: special issue of Stud-
ies of History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, deadline 1
May.
Classic Methodologies in the Philosophy of Science: special
issue of Journal for General Philosophy of Science, deadline
5
30 April.
What’s Hot in . . .
Science Policy
Science in ideal terms is often
imagined as purely grounded on
epistemic factors. From the per-
spective of sociology of science,
already Max Weber famously ar-
gued that professors should not ex-
press their political, religious, and
economic beliefs in front of stu-
dents. Though the motivation for
studying certain social phenomena is often external, a scientific
approach should, according to Weber, be free of non-epistemic
values. The neutral point of view should allow researchers to
draw conclusions based on evidence and not based on their
preconceptions. Moreover, traditional philosophy of science
relied on the hypothesis that epistemic and non-epistemic val-
ues in science should be kept apart. For instance, according
to Thomas Kuhn, simplicity, predictive power, and other epis-
temic values should guide the researchers when choosing a the-
ory. However, contemporary authors argue that science is not
and should not be detached from moral and social values (e.g.,
Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal 2009). De-
cisions about which line of research to pursue can be morally
relevant, e.g., refusing to participate in the development of bi-
ological weapons is a perfectly rational decision of a scientist.
Also, researchers could advise and direct responsible public po-
lices based on their results. Finally, the impact of certain non-
epistemic values on the research decisions of scientists can be
empirically tested.
While some non-epistemic values might be advantageous
and justified, for others one hopes that they do not affect sci-
entists. Moreover, not every scientific field operates the same.
It can be argued that economics as a field of research is strongly
influenced by social views and depending on them it develops
in different directions (e.g., proposing a regulated or a free mar-
ket). Mathematics, on the other hand, has a quite different
nature. Methods and results in natural sciences are less often
questioned in comparison to the ones in social sciences.
There are certain epistemic decisions of scientists that should
ideally be independent of their non-epistemic beliefs. For in-
stance, when scientists disagree about two theories, epistemic
tolerance stands for the readiness to accept that the opposing
view is also scientifically relevant and part of the research prac-
tice. On the other hand, epistemic authoritarianism stands for
accepting the dominant views and paradigms in a field with-
out questioning them. Epistemic tolerance can be understood
as an epistemic virtue promoting a plurality of methods and
hypotheses. It should enable the inclusion of minority views,
while epistemic authoritarianism makes it more difficult.
In a democratic society, political choice is guaranteed, and
every scientist freely chooses her political orientation. How-
ever, do these political and social choices influence the epis-
temic decisions of researchers? Our empirical study (Sikimić
et al., Rev.Phil.Psych. 2020) has shown that the political orien-
tation (left-center-right) did not have an impact on epistemic
tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, while the correla-
tion with social conservatism was relatively small. Scientists
scored high on the epistemic tolerance scale and low on the
epistemic authoritarianism scale, meaning that they are in gen-
eral open towards new ideas and approaches of their peers.
The expected difference has been detected between scientific
fields: social scientists scored higher on the epistemic toler-
ance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than
natural scientists. These results are encouraging. They indi-
cate that the scientific decisions of researchers are indepen-
dent of their socio-political views, while there is room for
assuming that researchers take into account morally relevant




Mathematicians are interested not only in proving things but
in understanding why they’re true. What should we make of
this? Under what circumstances does one piece of math explain
another?
Mathematical explanation is tricky. One reason why is that
it resists straightforward treatment along traditional lines. The
various popular approaches that link explanation to causation
seem like non-starters in the mathematical realm, for exam-
ple. And it’s not clear that we do much better with liber-
alizations of causal theories that countenance a wider array
of ontic dependence relations—roughly, the problem is that
there are too many explanations and not enough of the right
kind of metaphysical structure to underwrite them all. (Cf.
D’Alessandro, “Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Depen-
dence”, 2020, Philosophical Studies 177: 769-792.)
Unificationist and covering-law-type approaches face seri-
ous problems too. From among the major broadly realist the-
ories of explanation, then, perhaps the most promising one left
standing is the counterfactual account. Associated in recent
times with James Woodward and his followers, the basic idea
is that fact F explains fact G if G’s obtaining counterfactually
depends on F’s obtaining, meaning that G wouldn’t be the case
if F weren’t the case.
Before we can turn this idea loose on mathematical explana-
tion, though, we’ll first need to come up with a method for eval-
uating counterpossibles (or at least countermathematicals) that
doesn’t trivialize them all. (Recall that on the usual Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics, one evaluates a counterfactual If not-F, then
not-G by determining whether G is false in the closest possi-
ble worlds where F is false. If there are no worlds where F is
false, the conditional is vacuously true. This will always be the
case when F is a mathematical fact, on the standard assumption
that all mathematical facts are necessary.) It’s worth noting that
we have good independent reasons to want a workable theory
of counterpossibles, so the fact that the counterfactual approach
requires such a theory needn’t be seen as a strike against it. (Cf.
Nolan, “Hyperintensional Metaphysics”, 2014, Philosophical
Studies 171: 149-160.)
It’s not so obvious what an adequate treatment of counter-
mathematicals should look like, though. In the closest world
where, say, Fermat’s Last Theorem is false, what else is differ-
ent? Does the disturbance ramify all the way down to the ax-
ioms, or can it be localized in some principled way? If we keep
the axioms the same but negate FLT, we’ll end up with a con-
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tradiction somewhere, and what should we do about that? Our
intuitions about the right answers to such questions seem much
less clear than our judgments about ordinary counterfactuals, so
it may not even be apparent what the criteria for success should
be.
Nevertheless, recent work has
tackled these problems in hopes
of claiming mathematical explana-
tion as a victory for the counterfac-
tual theory. Two major efforts in
this direction are Baron, Colyvan
and Ripley, “A Counterfactual Ap-
proach to Explanation in Mathe-
matics”, 2020, Philosophia Math-
ematica 28: 1-34, and Reutlinger,
Colyvan and Krzyżanowska, “The
Prospects for a Monist Theory of
Non-causal Explanation in Science
and Mathematics”, 2020, Erkennt-
nis. These papers have Mark Colyvan as a common denomina-
tor and their approaches are intended to be complementary; I’ll
call this group of authors CBRRK.
CBRRK favor a Lewis-like approach to evaluating counter-
possibles. On this view, if we want to make sense of a statement
like If Fermat’s Last Theorem were false, then P, we first iden-
tify the closest worlds to actuality where FLT is false. Here
closeness is determined by sameness of general mathematical
principles “upstream” from FLT, and by overall similarity in
matters of mathematical fact. In turn, “upstreamness” is char-
acterized in terms of an intuitive notion of dependence: one fact
is upstream of another if the latter depends on the former in an
appropriate sense. Putting all this together, our FLT counter-
possible is true just in case P holds in the worlds identified by
this procedure. (CBRRK’s view involves further details which
I’ve left out here for brevity.)
I think this approach has a lot to recommend it. CBRRK use
their theory to give a clever analysis of an explanatory proof
from Euclidean geometry (which evokes the analysis of the
Butterfly Theorem from Frans and Weber, “Mechanistic Expla-
nation and Explanatory Proof”, 2014, Philosophia Mathemat-
ica 22, 231-248). CBRRK also have reasonable things to say
about how to handle contradictions and how their proposal can
be realized in the structural equations modeling framework. On
the whole, it’s certainly the best extant version of a counterfac-
tual theory of mathematical explanation.
Nevertheless, I think some important and thorny questions
remain for CBRRK’s account in particular and for counterfac-
tual theories in general. To name just one, is there an over-
generation problem here? Countermathematical dependence
seems pretty easy to come by, whereas explanatory relations
are relatively rare. Consider Gauss’s first proof of the quadratic
reciprocity theorem, for instance, which he and many oth-
ers considered paradigmatically unexplanatory. The proof is
a complicated case analysis that considers and rules out eight
possible types of counterexample. On any sensible analysis,
we’ll presumably find that the truth of the theorem depends on
the nonexistence of any such counterexample—if there were a
counterexample, then quadratic reciprocity wouldn’t hold. By
the counterfactual theorist’s lights, this would seem to make
Gauss’s proof explanatory. But this is the wrong result. (For
more on this case, see D’Alessandro, “Proving Quadratic Reci-
procity”, 2020, Synthese.)
There’s clearly lots of room here for discussion, and that’s
an exciting place for a field to be. I look forward to future work
on CBRRK’s approach as well as the continued growth of the
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